Game Theory (ECON 159) We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition. 00:00 - Chapter 1. Coordination Games: Scope for Leadership and Strategic Complements 04:59 - Chapter 2. Coordination Games: The Battle of the Sexes 18:37 - Chapter 3. Cournot Duopoly: Math 53:28 - Chapter 4. Cournot Duopoly: Real World Examples Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.

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